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CRIMINAL LAw-lMMUNITY FROM PRosEcunoN STATUTEs--RBvocAnoN
OF LICENSE AS PENALTY OR FoRFB1TURE-Plaintiff, an architect, involuntarily
testified as to facts involved in a bribery transaction, before a state attorney, a
grand jury, and at the trial of members of the Board of Public Instruction for
bribery and conspiracy to bribe. Subsequently the State Board of Architecture
filed charges against him seeking to revoke his certificate, basing these charges
on the same bribery transaction, in which he allegedly had participated. Plaintiff thereupon instituted suit for declaration of his rights and immunities. He
claimed an immunity by virtue of a Florida statute which provided that in connection with certain crimes (including bribery) "no person shall be prosecuted
or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction ..."
concerning which he involuntarily testified.1 The circuit court granted an injunction against the proceeding for revocation, and the Board of Architecture
appealed. On appeal, held, affirmed. A proceeding to revoke an architect's cer-

124 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1944) §932.29; see also 22 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1944) §838.08.
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tificate falls within the protection of an immunity from prosecution statute.

Florida State Board of Architecture 11. Seymour, (Fla. 1952) 62 S. (2d) I.
Over the course of the past two centuries legislatures have passed hundreds
of laws2 extending immunity from prosecution, or protection against subsequent
use of testimony, to persons whose testimony in certain classes of criminal prosecution has been considered of great value to the state, in return for the removal
of their constitutional or statutory privilege against self-incrimination. The statute involved in the principal case provides that no person shall be excused from
testifying in cases concerning bribery on grounds of self-incrimination, but in
exchange the statute gives any person testifying under this compulsion an immunity from certain consequences. This particular statute grants broad protection
to witnesses in prosecutions for bribery (and other offenses) since in return for
abolition of the constitutional privilege it guarantees them freedom from prosecution or subjection to "any penalty or forfeiture" for any matter concerning
which they testify. 3 This is a guaranty in terms going beyond the Florida constitutional provision which declares simply that no person shall be "compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.''4 If the statutory immunity
were limited in scope to the terms of the constitutional privilege the problem of
construction arising in the principal case would be simple, since it is generally
recognized that a proceeding to revoke a license is not a criminal action. The
additional sweep of the amnesty, however, embracing penalties and forfeitures,
forces the issue of whether a revocation proceeding results in a penalty or forfeiture. In other contexts it has been held that the purpose of statutes authorizing revocation of licenses is to protect the public interest rather than to punish or
inllict a penalty upon the particular licensee.5 This principle has been established
in the face of the argument that due process is denied by the taking away of
"vested" or "property" rights by a nonjudicial body. 6 The same has been true
as against the contention that a statute prohibiting licensees to continue their
calling if they have committed certain crimes is ex post facto legislation as to
persons who were convicted before enactment of the statute, since this imposes
a later additional "penalty."7 The few cases in point have split on the question
of whether revocation amounts to an additional "penalty" under, a statute other2 Statutes are collected in 8 WIGMORB, EvmENcE, 3d ed., §2281 (1940).
s The first statute phrased in these broad terms was 46 Geo. ill, c. 37 (1806); at no
time, however, have the penalties and forfeitures which were intended to be embraced by
this terminology been spelled out.
4 Florida Declaration of Rights, §12, 25 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1944).
5 In addition to the cases cited in the next four notes, see cases cited in Prichard v.
Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E. (2d) 393 (1941), a case upholding revocation of a driver's
license to prevent danger to the public.
6 Johnson v. Commissioner of Agriculture, 314 Mich. 548, 22 N.W. (2d) 893 (1946);
Klaftner v. State Board of Examiners of Architects, 259 ID. 15, 102 N.E. 193 (1913); West
Coast Co. v. Contractors' State License Board, 72 Cal. App. (2d) 287, 164 P. (2d) 811
(1945).
1Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573 (1898); Murrill v. State Board
of Accountancy, 97 Cal. App. (2d) 709, 218 P. (2d) 569 (1950).
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wise spelling out specifically the punishment for violation of regulatory legislation;8 and some decisions have upheld the validity of legislation or regulations
authorizing revocation despite lack of fault or knowledge on the part of the
holder.9 In addition to protection of the public from unfitness and incompetency
in its dealings with certain trades and professions, another theory runs through
the cases supporting revocation-protection of the integrity and good name of
the particular calling. 10 This idea was perhaps first expressed by Lord Mansfield,
in a disbarment proceeding-"••. the question is, whether, after the conduct of
this man, it is proper that he should continue a member of a profession which
should stand free from all suspicion...• It is not by way of punishment; but the
Court in such cases exercise their discretion, whether a man whom they have
formerly admitted, is a proper person to be continued on the roll or not."11 In
view of these holdings as to the nature of revocation 'in other contexts, there
appears to be sound logic in the proposition that the "penalty or forfeiture" provision in an immunity statute should not encompass revocation of licenses. The
strongest support for this position is found in a thorough opinion by Judge
Cardozo in a 1917 review of a New York disbarment proceeding,12 where the
court denied an attorney's claim of immunity under a statute almost identical
in language with that involved in the principal case. In concluding that the
grant of immunity should be only as broad as the constitutional privilege,
Cardozo presented, inter alia, the argument that to do more would make the
statute illusory, since the state does not have power to excuse many penalties
and forfeitures.18
s Holding no penalty: Daniel v. City of Clovis, 34 N.M. 239, 280 P. 260 (1929);
Prawdzik v. Grand Rapids, 313 Mich. 376, 21 N.W. (2d) 168 (1946). Holding revocation
to be a penalty: United States ex rel. Daly v. MacFarland, 28 App. D.C. 552 (1907);
Greater New York Athletic Club v. Wurster, 19 Misc. 443, 43 N.Y.S. 703 (1897).
o Cases collected in 3 A.L.R. (2d) 107 (1949).
10 "[Revocation] is not intended for the punishment of the individual contractor, but
for the protection of the contracting business as well as the public by removing, in proper
cases, either permanently or temporarily, from the conduct of a contractor's business a
licensee whose method of doing business indicates a lack of integrity upon his part or a
tendency to impose upon those who deal with him." West Coast Co. v. Contractors'
Board, supra note 6 at 301-302.
11 Ex parte Brounsall, 2 Cowp. 829, 98 Eng. Rep. 1385 (1778). Here the attorney
was disbarred although he had previously won a pardon for his offense by a ''burning in the
hand," and he had committed no misdeeds in the five years since his wrongful conduct.
1 2 Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917). Accord: In re Biggers, 24
Okla. 842, 104 P. 1083 (1909); also Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Ala. 91, 12 S. (2d) 314
(1943), under a somewhat differently worded statute. It should be noted that there are
stronger factors supporting refusal of immunity in these disbarment proceedings than in
other revocation actions, since an attorney is an officer of the court, and the courts traditionally insist on a very high standard of conduct on the part of attorneys. Otherwise, "The
knave and criminal may pose as a minister of justice." Matter of Rouss, supra at 91.
18 The opinion gives as an example the forfeiture of an estate at the election of the
landlord, which the legislature cannot waive. It should be noted, however, that certain
actions which might be said to involve forfeitures, such as that involved in the principal
case, are proper objects of legislative grace; the state is the other party in these cases. The
position that the only forfeitures which the immunity statute is designed to protect against
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On the other hand, there are cogent arguments supporting the conclusion
reached in the principal case. By way of analogy, although uncertainty exists
as to what present-day forfeitures and penalties fall within the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination, Dean Wigmore states that as a matter of
history, the courts have always leaned to liberality. 14 As a practical matter, it
seems rather unrealistic to tell a man that deprivation of his right to carry on his
calling, because of his alleged complicity in a criminal act, is not a "penalty" for
the wrongful conduct-despite the fact that the primary theory of revocation is
protection of the public. But the compelling argument for the Florida court's
ruling drives to the heart of the policy underlying these immunity statutes-as
stated in the principal case, ''If any other rule were followed no one would
testify in such proceedings.''15 While it is perhaps difficult to assess accurately
the value to the public these immunity statutes have, their very number indicates notable success in making available otherwise unobtainable evidence. An
argument may be made that since the constitutional privilege might be held to
protect witnesses only from criminal liability, the witness could be compelled to
testify even without the immunity. The force of this point is weakened by the
considerations that the constitution might be construed to envelop revocations,
that the plain language of the statute covers "any penalty or forfeiture," and that
production of voluntary testimony from witnesses, voluntary and involuntary,
will be facilitated by granting the immunity. In view of the practical problems
of criminal law enforcement and prosecution, it is submitted that the principal
case, in giving full play to the policy prompting enactment of immunity statutes,
achieved the more beneficial result.
Richard W. Pogue, S.Ed.

are those constituting part of a punishment for crime (see Matter of Rouss, supra note 12,
at 90), seems an unwarranted assumption-surely some statutory forfeitures are not designed
to constitute a punishment.
14 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,

15 Principal

case at 3.

3d ed., §2256 (1940).

